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Abstract
This paper proposes a scalable approach for 
distinguishing malicious files from clean files by 
investigating the behavioural features using logs of 
various API calls. We also propose, as an alternative 
to the traditional method of manually identifying 
malware files, an automated classification system 
using runtime features of malware files. For both 
projects, we use an automated tool running in a virtual 
environment to extract API call features from 
executables and apply pattern recognition algorithms 
and statistical methods to differentiate between 
files.  Our experimental results, based on a dataset of 
1368 malware and 456 cleanware files, provide an 
accuracy of over 97% in distinguishing malware from
cleanware. Our techniques provide a similar accuracy 
for classifying malware into families. In both cases, 
our results outperform comparable previously 
published techniques.  
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1 Introduction 
With the rise of the shadow Internet economy, 
malware is no longer just used to damage, break or 
intrude on computer network systems, but now exists
primarily as a tool used by criminals to make profit 
[11].  This has driven an enormous increase in new 
malware appearing each day.  The traditional method
of manually determining a signature for each new 
malware file has been shown to be unscaleable.  Anti-
malware vendors are now employing new techniques 
to create generic signatures capable of detecting 
multiple variants of malware. However there are no 
clean-cut rules for generically distinguishing malware 
from cleanware.  In fact, the API calls employed by
malware in their malicious behaviour have legitimate 
use in clean software thus making it difficult for anti-
virus developers to develop generic techniques which 
detect malware with 100% accuracy. 
 An added complication is the current trend 
towards cloud computing.  Businesses are migrating 
their mission critical applications to cloud computing 
platforms and malware writers are expected to start
targeting users of cloud computing.  Therefore anti-
virus researchers need to update their strategy to 
defend against malware on cloud computing services.    
Cloud computing requires real-time, timely responses 
of the anti-malware analysis system. Furthermore, in a 
cloud computing environment, knowing whether a file
is malicious or clean is more urgent than knowing the 
specific family from which the malware is from. 
Given this situation, developing a rapid, automatic and 
efficient software differentiation system is extremely 
urgent.  
However, the performance of such a system relies 
heavily on the techniques adopted. Techniques used in 
the research literature to detect and classify malware 
can be divided into two main groups: static extraction 
and dynamic extraction. Static extraction techniques 
refer to scanning the binary code to determine 
properties of the program without running it. These
techniques were first utilised by compiler developers 
in code optimization and reverse engineering and later 
widely used in malware detection [2, 3, 8]. As 
malware anti-detection techniques, such as 
polymorphism and metamorphism, continued to 
improve, people realized that static extraction alone 
would not be sufficient to detect malicious code and 
that dynamic analysis is a necessary complement to 
static detection techniques. The reason for including 
dynamic analysis is that dynamic techniques can 
monitor the instructions that are actually executed by a 
program and which are immune to many of the code 
obfuscating transformations. Dynamic analysis 
monitors the execution of malware, usually in a 
virtualised or emulated environment. As malware is 
continually evolving, dynamic analysis is becoming 
the dominant direction of anti-malware research.  
In this paper we use dynamic API call sequences as 
features to develop an automatic, dynamic malware 
classification system. In our experiments, we execute 
each file in a virtual machine environment for a 
limited time to obtain trace reports which reveal the 
actual behaviour of the code. We then extract features 
from the trace reports. These two stages of our work 
provide a new contribution to software extraction 
research. We then move to the third stage: 
distinguishing of cleanware from malware. Our 
method gives an accuracy of over 97%. Finally, in the 
fourth stage of the paper, we classify our malware 
files by family, again achieving an accuracy of over 
97%. Our accuracy in both cases is better than that of 
any previously published generic classification 
techniques. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In 
Section 2 we summarize the relevant literature in this area.  
Section 3 describes our feature extraction method while 
Section 4 develops the statistical methodology and the
malware versus cleanware classification. In Section 5, we 
present the malware family classification. Section 6 
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provides discussion and comparison of our method with 
comparable existing methods; conclusions follow in 
Section 7. 
2 Related Work 
Traditional anti-malware detection and classification 
systems are based on static features extracted from 
executables by reverse-engineering. In [10,15,16,17] the 
authors proposed an approach for detecting malware in 
the windows platform by analysing the windows API 
calling sequence which relates to the behaviour of a piece 
of PE (Portable Executable) code. This information in PE 
files is static and different from the true calls of program, 
and it is easily modified by obfuscation technology, thus 
is no longer reliable as a malware classifier. In [9], the 
authors used opcode sequence frequencies to calculate the 
cosine similarity between two PE executable files. These 
opcode sequences are also static and can be evaded by 
obfuscation technology.  
In [6], the authors explored the limitation of static 
extraction methodology. In this paper, they introduced a 
code obfuscation schema which demonstrates that static
extraction alone is not enough to either detect or classify 
malicious code; they propose that dynamic extraction is a 
necessary complement to static techniques as it is 
significantly less vulnerable to code obfuscating 
transformations. 
 More and more researchers are now working on 
dynamic techniques to improve the effectiveness and 
accuracy of malware extraction and classification. In [14] 
the authors used dynamic extraction technologies to 
classify malware by using a controller to manage 
execution, stopping the execution after 10 seconds. They 
firstly calculate the similarity between two API call 
sequences by constructing a similarity matrix based on 
action codes (actually the sequence of API calls). 
They then compute the relative frequency of each 
function call and construct a second matrix based on the 
Hellinger distance, which measures how much 
information is contained in each malware file. Finally, 
two phylogenetic trees are constructed using the similarity 
matrix and the Hellinger distance matrices separately. 
Their test set is a small set of 104 malware files and their 
algorithm has relatively high time and space complexities. 
In addition they did not include any clean code in the test; 
nor did the authors mention the classification accuracy of 
their work. 
   In [1] the authors proposed a composite method which 
extracts statistical features from both spatial and temporal 
information available in run-time API calls. Spatial 
features are generally statistical properties such as means, 
variances and entropies of address pointers and size 
parameters; the temporal feature chosen was the nth order 
discrete time Markov chain [11] in which each state 
corresponds to a particular API call. They use 237 core 
API calls from six different functional categories and use 
a 10-fold cross validation procedure with five standard 
classification algorithms. Their method gives good results 
with 96.3% classification accuracy but at the cost of high 
computational complexity. 
3 Extractions of Behavioural Features from 
API Calls 
In this section, we describe the process of file 
execution and collection of run-time trace reports based 
on API system calls. First we generate a list of files from 
our existing database “Ida2DB” [18] which includes the 
module ID, family and file location. Then we execute the 
files one by one in our virtual environment and collect 
execution logs. 
3.1 Files Used 
The malware used in our experiment was collected 
from CA’s VET zoo (www.ca.com), along with a 
collection of our own clean files. The files from VET Zoo 
were already classified into families. In our tests we used 
files from 10 malware families with a total of 1368
variants, as shown in Table 1. The first 7 families have 
been pre-classified as trojans; the next 3 families as 
viruses. The clean files were taken from the System32 
directories of Windows 98, Windows 2000, Windows 
2003 Windows XP and Windows 7.  We chose system 
files as our clean files as these are likely to make some of 
the same low level API calls as are used by malicious 
programs, thus providing a challenging task for our 
methodology.  In all, we have used 456 cleanware files
from Windows System32 directories.    
Table 1: Experimental dataset 
 Family No. of Files 
Malware Files 
classified as families 
Clagger 47 
Robknot 119 
Alureon 56 
Bambo 70 
Beovens 144 
Boxed 366 
Emerleox 77 
Looked 67 
Agobot 340 
Robzip  82 
 Sub Total 1368 
Cleanware files  Cleanware  456
 Total   1824 
3.2 Trace Tool 
The trace tool, which we call HookMe, was developed 
by anti-malware researchers at HCL Technologies and is 
built around Microsoft technology called Detours [4] 
which is designed to intercept Win32 functions by re-
writing target function images and hooking API functions 
that are then imported into an executable. HookMe 
focuses on configuring Detours to specify what to collect 
and then directs output to a trace report. It thus actively 
monitors the state changes in the system and generates a 
trace report which reflects the behaviours of the files in 
terms of API function calls. 
In our testing, we recorded the runtime behaviour of
binaries using the tool HookMe, which then logs various 
events (for example, which API calls the binary makes).  
In our experiments we generated trace reports for each 
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6. Discussions
6.1 Cleanware versus Malware
Distinguishing malware from cleanware is more 
critical for malware detection than malware family 
classification, and can offer a first line of defence against 
malware. Recent research trends are moving toward the 
classification of clean files from malicious file. [7, 9, 15, 
17] We have investigated some recent work classifying 
malware versus cleanware and compared it with ours.   
Table 6 summarizes this comparison across results 
achieving at least 80% accuracy, and compares their 
outcomes with those of our method.  
Santos et.al in [9] used opcode sequence frequencies as 
features to calculate the cosine similarity between two PE 
executable files. There are 13189 malware files from 6 
malware families and 13000 benign files in their dataset. 
They show that if they select an appropriate similarity ratio 
threshold, their method would be a very useful tool to 
identify malware variants from benign files; they do not 
mention the classification accuracy. Ye et al. in [17] used 
static API call sequences as a feature of associative rule 
learning. They test 35000 malware and 15000 cleanware 
files and their classification accuracy is 88%. Wang et al. 
in [15] used static API call sequences from 714 files which 
are pre-identified as either normal (361) or virus programs 
(353); they obtain 93.71% classification accuracy. 
Moskovitch et al. in [7] used the text categorization 
process and examined the relationship between the MFP
(malicious file percentage) in the test set, which represents 
real-life scenario, and in the training-set, which being used 
for training the classifier.  The found that the best mean 
performance is associated with a 50% MFP in the training 
set.   
Table 6. Comparison of our model with existing work 
 Experime
ntal Data 
Method Accuracy 
Santos
et.al
(2010)[9] 
6(F)/ 
13189(m)/
13000(c) 
Static feature 
extraction
No 
accuracy
provided. 
Ye et.al 
(2010)[17] 
35000(m)/
15000(c) 
Static feature 
extraction
88% 
Wang et.al 
(2009)[15] 
353(m)/ 
361 (c) 
Static feature 
extraction
93.71% 
Moskovitch
et al. (2008) 
[7]
7688(m)/ 
22735(c) 
Static feature 
extraction 
with MFP 
95% 
Our 
method 
1369(m)/ 
454(c) 
Dynamic 
feature 
extraction 
with MFP 
97.3% 
Note:    F:    the number of malware family; 
             S:    the total number of files; 
             m:  the number of malware files; 
             c:   the number of clean files; 
6.2 Malware Family Classifications 
We also compare our empirical performance of 
malware family classification with similar existing 
methods and summarised it in Table 7.  We have 
considered only the recent results in Table 7 which 
achieved classification accuracy of 80% or above.  
Sathyanarayan et al. in [10] used static extraction to 
extract API calls from known malware in order to 
construct a signature for an entire class. The API calls of 
an unclassified file of malware can then be compared with 
the 'signature' API calls for a family to determine if the file 
belongs in the family or not. They tested eight families 
with 126 files in total, but no specific classification 
accuracy was provided.  Ahmed et al. in [1] proposed a 
composite method which extracts statistical features from 
both spatial and temporal information available in run-time 
API calls. There are 516 malware files in their dataset and 
they obtained 96.3% classification accuracy. Wagener et 
al. in [14] tested a small set of malware, 104 files, by using 
dynamic extraction technologies;  they did not provide 
classification accuracy. The authors in [4] traced the 
behaviour of malware in a virtual machine environment 
and used these traces to extract string information. They 
then applied SVM classifiers and overall performance was 
determined to be approximately 83.3%. Our method of 
using dynamic API features got accuracy over 97%, which 
clearly outperforms all other methods mentioned here.
Table 7.Comparison of similar existing techniques 
with our method 
Paper Exp.  
Data 
Method Accuracy 
Sathyanarayan 
et.al(2008) 
[10] 
8(F)/ 
126(S) 
Static Did not mention 
the quantitative 
accuracy  
Tian, R et.al. 
(2008) [12] 
7(F)/ 
721(S) 
Static 87% 
Tian, R et.al. 
(2009) [13] 
13(F)/ 
1367(S) 
Static 97% 
Ahmed et.al. 
(2009) [1] 
516(S) Dynamic 96.3% 
Wagener et.al. 
(2008) [14] 
104(S) Dynamic Did not mention 
the quantitative 
accuracy 
Zhao et.al. 
(2010) [18] 
11(F)/ 
3996(S) 
Dynamic 83.3% 
Our method 1673(S) Dynamic 97.4% 
7.  Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, the behavioural information from both 
malware and cleanware binary files are extracted to
classify software in two different ways: i) malware
versus cleanware classification and ii) malware family 
classification. The extracted API calls form the basis 
for modelling the behavioural patterns of software in 
order to distinguish between classes. Our contributions 
to the field of malware detection based on behavioural 
feature analysis are fourfold. The first and foremost 
contribution is the outlining of a methodology to 
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extract relevant behavioural features of API calls; such 
features include hooking of the system services and
creation or modification of files. The second 
contribution is the provision of a statistical analysis of 
the API calls from log files generated by executing the 
files in a virtual environment. The third contribution is 
a method of distinguishing malware from cleanware 
using a 2-class classification model; this model 
achieves 97.3% performance in terms of accuracy. The 
fourth contribution is malware family classification, a 
similar process to that of testing cleanware versus
malware, and this model achieves a classification 
accuracy of 97.4 %.  
Our methodology could be used to provide effective 
defence against zero-day malware, as cloud computing 
requires real-time, timely responses of the anti-
malware analysis system.  In future work we will 
expand our data set and test unknown malware against 
the known families. We will continue to look for 
features which lead to an ever better classification, 
approaching 100%.  
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